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THE  STRUCTURE  OF DIALOG 
 
Jens Allwood 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a kind of tutorial concerning some of the 
phenomena which contribute to the structure of dialog.  It, therefore, gives an overview 
rather than a detailed account of these phenomena.  It must also be said that the 
overview is given from a linguistic pragmatic perspective, namely, that of "activity 
based communication analysis" and summarizes some of the more detailed accounts 
published elsewhere, cf. for example Allwood, 1995. 
 
 
2. Multilayered Constraints and Enablements 
 
Human dialog and human communication, in general, exhibit a very complex network 
of relations which at the same time both make the interaction possible and constrain it.  
At least the following levels of organisation are involved in any human activity, where 
each level provides necessary but not sufficient conditions for the next main level and, 
thus, also necessary but not sufficient enablements (resources) and constraints on 
communication whether it occurs in spoken or in written form.   
 
(i) Physical: The communicators in dialog are physical entities and their 
communicative contributions are physical processes/entities (usually of an 
optical or acoustical nature). 
 
(ii) Biological:  The communicators are biological organisms whose communicative 
contributions from this perspective can be seen as biological activation and 
directed behavior. 
 
(iii) Psychological:  
 (A) Perception, understanding and emotion: The communicators are 
perceiving, understanding and emotional beings whose communicative 
contributions are perceptually comprehensible and emotionally charged 
phenomena. 
 
 (B) Motivation, rationality and agency:  The communicators are motivated 
(including ethical, cooperative motives), rational agents whose communicative 
contributions, consequently, are motivated, rational acts (compare Grice, 1975, 
Allwood, 1976 and section 3.3). 
 
(iv) Social:  
A: Culture, social institution. The communicators are, at least provisionally, 
members of a culture and of one or more social institutions and their 
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communicative contributions can, therefore, be characterized as cultural and 
social institutional acts. 
B: Language. They are also members of one or more linguistic communities and 
their contributions are normally linguistic acts. 
 
C: Activity. They, normally, play a role in a social activity and their 
communicative contributions are contributions to that activity through their role, 
e.g. as a sales clerk telling a customer about the price of some goods or a teacher 
lecturing to students (see section 6). 
 
D: Communication.  They, normally, at a given point in time, focus more on 
either sending or receiving information, i.e., they are primarily either in the 
sender, (speaker, writer, etc.) role or in the receiver (addressee, listener, reader, 
etc.) role.  In the sending role, they are mostly performing a particular 
communicative act which makes them the agent of actions such as stating, 
asking, requesting, etc.  This leads to characterizations of their communicative 
contributions by such labels as sent message, speech, writing, statement, question 
and request. In the receiving role, they are instead agents of actions such as 
perceiving, understanding, evaluating and responding which are complementary 
to the actions performed in the sending role (see Allwood, 1995). 
 
Since communication, in this way, involves a network of finely interwoven enablements 
and constraints, the "glue" or "cohesion" at work in an activity and a dialogue must be 
construed in a similar multilayered way.  One of the consequences of this is that 
communication and the successive contributions to an activity mostly are characterized 
by such features as  redundancy, predictability, recoverability but also, given the 
constraints on human perception and attention, by a certain indeterminacy with regard to 
what is the actual current relevance of its various dimensions. 
 
In order, however, to analyze the nature of the redundancy in the "glue", the layers have 
to be described both individually and in relation to each other. It is to this task that I 
now turn, in trying to describe some aspects of the levels described above.  I will start 
by first taking a look at some of the sources and vehicles of the information which is 
shared in communication.  The basic perspective here is that communication, like the 
etymology of the word indicates, primarily involves sharing of information rather than 
transfer or transmission of information which are rather seen as a means to achieve such 
sharing. 
 
 
3. Sources and Vehicles of Joint Information 
 
3.1 Vehicles and sources 
 
Human communication makes use of or is influenced by at least the following sources 
or vehicles of information. 
 
(i) Sources largely uninfluenced by mankind, often called natural signs.  For 
example, clouds in the sky can tell us that rain is approaching. 
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(ii) Objects or behavior which has been unintentionally produced.  For example, 
archaeological investigations of stone age trash heaps may tell us about stone age 
habits of culture or a reflexive gesture might tell us about an emotional state. 
 
(iii) Intentionally produced Artifacts.  For example, furniture or tools may give us 
information about the function for which they have been made. 
 
(iv) Intentional action.  Intentional actions can, for example, tell us about the purpose 
(intention, function or meaning) of the agent of the action.  An important subset 
of intentional actions are made up of communicative actions, the primary 
function of which is to share some particular information with an interlocutor. 
 
In human dialog all four types can play a role, even if mostly types (ii), (iii) and (iv) are 
relevant. 
 
3.2 Multidimensionality 
 
Human communication and dialog are, thus, multidimensional.  Table 1 gives an 
impression of some of the terminology which can be used to describe this 
multidimensionality. 
 
Table 1 Aspects of the multidimensionality of human communication 
 
 
Human communication is 
 
Multi- modal with modality of 
 communication 
 medial regard mode 
 transmission 
 channel to medium 
 representation 
 vehicle  channel  perception 
 instrument  means 
 understanding 
 
 
In principle, all the three main stages of communication, i.e., production, transmission 
and reception, have a multidimensional character.  However, it is still a great challenge 
to find out more about how we distribute information over different modalities in 
production and transmission, or about how we integrate information from different 
modalities in perception and understanding.  Is it reasonable, for example,  to assume 
that there is both modality specific and modality neutral information?  Or is all 
information really modality specific and what we might think of as modality neutral 
information just a complex correspondence between different types of modality specific 
information? 
 
3.3 Motivation, rationality, agency, cooperation and ethics 
 
One of the levels of organization (level (iii) B above) which is relevant for the study of 
communication allows us to see communicators as rational agents pursuing various 
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motives and goals, some of which are cooperative and ethical. In fact,  communication 
in many ways seems to build on the human ability for rational coordinated (cooperative) 
interaction. 
 
Let us now take a look at this ability. One of the first attempts to give an analysis of it 
was presented in Grice, 1975.  Another attempt which avoids some of the difficulties in 
Grice, 1975 (cf. Allwood, 1976 and 1995) was presented in Allwood, 1976 where I 
made some suggestions in which I tried to build on Grice´s insights.  The analysis 
presents six principles of communication seen as a species of rational motivated action 
and interaction. 
 
(A) Agency  (i) Intentionality 
    (ii) Volition 
(B) Motivation  (i) General 
    (ii) Pleasure/ pain 
(C) Rationality  (i) Adequacy 
    (ii) Competence 
 
The two first principles postulate that action is analyzed as behavior involving intention 
and volition. The next two principles postulate that  motivation underlies action and 
often involves the wish to seek pleasure and escape pain. Other kinds of motivation 
involve, for instance,  cooperation, ethics, power and esthetics. The last two principles 
say that rationality can be analyzed in terms of adequate (efficient) and competent 
(making sure of preconditions) action. The notions of agency, motivation and rationality 
are then used to give an analysis of ethics and cooperation as relevant for 
communication. Ethics is analyzed as involving the "golden rule" or in Kantian terms 
"universalizability" with regard to agency, motivation and rationality. "Doing unto 
others what you would have them do unto you" is claimed to entail "making it possible 
for others to be rational, motivated agents". If you consider other persons in this way, 
you take them into "ethical consideration". Communicative interaction is claimed to 
always involve some degree of cooperation which is defined as follows: Two agents 
cooperate to the extent that they: 
 
(i) take each other into cognitive consideration  
(ii) have a joint purpose  
(iii) take each other into ethical consideration  
(iv) trust each other with regard to (i) - (iii) 
 
Communication always involves at least cognitive consideration, i.e., an attempt to 
perceive and understand/explain another person's actions whether they are meant to be 
communicative or not. If communication is intentional, it is further claimed to involve 
at least one joint purpose, i.e., the purpose of sharing information, or perhaps better, 
sharing understanding which incidentally also is what the etymology of communication 
(communicare: to make common or shared) indicates. 
 
Communication is always cooperative in the first sense and mostly also in the second 
sense, even if it involves conflict.  You cannot deal your opponent a blow, and stay safe, 
unless you cognitively consider him/her and for many kinds of conflictual action, you 
also want your opponent to understand what you are doing or saying which requires 
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sharing at least some information and considering your opponent's possibility to do so as 
well. 
 
Communication is, however, very often cooperative in much more than the minimal 
sense just described.  Usually, it involves ethical consideration, we don't lie to other 
people (more than marginally), we don't usually hurt them, we don't usually impose on 
them. In fact, politeness norms in most cultures often seem to have the purpose of 
preventing pain and imposition.  In most cultures it is, for example, more polite to say 
things analogous to can you/would you open the window than merely ordering open the 
window!  Communication also often involves trust.  Normally, we don't think others are 
lying, trying to hurt us or impose on us. 
 
3.4 Understanding, explanation and empathy 
 
Another facet of the multidimensionality of human communication and dialog is that the 
receptive side and not only the expressive, productive side of communication is 
multidimensional.  Reception and interpretation require a combination of an 
"explanatory" perspective directed to causal regularities, an "understanding" 
hermeneutic perspective directed to interpretation of conventions and intentions, and an 
"empathic" perspective directed towards sharing emotions and attitudes. 
 
We have already noted above that an important part of being able to understand another 
person is being able to interpret the purpose or the  motives behind his communicative 
and non-communicative actions.  If we cannot find any such purpose or motive, we 
cannot "understand" him/her as a rational motivated agent but have instead to try to 
comprehend his/her actions in some other way, for example, by "explaining" them 
causally.  In fact, conceptually speaking, both "understanding"(in the narrow sense used 
here) and "explaining" can be seen as special cases of "comprehending" or 
"understanding in a wider sense" which can be defined as "establishing a meaningful 
connection between input information and stored background information". It could also 
be claimed that "understanding in a narrow sense", i.e., the understanding of intentions 
and motives, can be seen as a special case of "explaining", in view of the causal role of 
motives and intentions.  
 
In everyday life and conversation, we constantly switch between an "understanding"(in 
the narrow sense) and an "explanatory" mode of comprehension.  If another person 
coughs, this can be because he/she wants us to notice something fishy (purpose) or 
because something obstructed his/her breathing (cause).  Likewise, if a normally shy 
person A says "I love you" to B, after he/she has had a few drinks, our comprehension of 
A's utterance would combine understanding (he/she was motivated by love) with 
explanation (the drinks had caused him/her to be less bound by social restrictions). 
 
Thus, understanding guided by rationality, motivation and agency is an essential 
ingredient of both the production and understanding of human communication, but it is 
not the only ingredient.  Other ingredients are provided by explanations in 
communications based on the physical, biological, psychological and social resources, 
and constraints.  These are also necessary and are drawn upon continuously to 
supplement interpretation and comprehension when "understanding" in terms of rational 
motivated action is insufficient. Perhaps, though, we as communicators usually want to 
  7 
be "understood" rather than merely "explained" and therefore also primarily try to 
understand others by trying to see them as relevant (motivated rational agents). 
However, we often combine this with comprehending them by "explanation". 
 
Philosophically speaking, this means that, in relation to the views put forth, for 
example, in Dilthey, 1883 and von Wright, 1971, I do not believe that "explanation" and 
"understanding" should be pursued separately in something like 
"Geisteswissenschaffen" and "Naturwissenschaffen" but rather that they should be 
regarded as possibly analytically distinguishable modes of comprehension, for which it 
is a challenge to find new forms of integration. 
 
There is also a third dimension of comprehension in the broad sense - empathy.  
Normally in communication, we are not only influenced rationally and cognitively but 
also affected by other people's emotions and attitudes.  The mechanisms whereby this 
takes place partly depend on what has already been said about explanation and 
understanding but partly takes place on low levels of awareness via biologically 
conditioned processes of imitation and resonance.  In the positive case, emotional 
influence results in empathy, i.e. sharing of feelings but in the negative case it can have 
the opposite effect of emotional closure, fear, aggressiveness and biased negative 
misinterpretation. 
 
3.5 Levels of intentionality and awareness 
 
In dialog and communication, we are, thus, producing, perceiving, understanding,  
explaining  and empathising in a multidimensional way.  Another aspect of this, which 
we have already touched upon in considering emotional influence and empathy, is 
brought out by considering the fact that communication and dialog usually take place on 
several levels of awareness simultaneously.  Both the sender (speaker) and the receiver 
(listener) normally operate on several levels of awareness and intentionality 
simultaneously.  The differentiation of these levels is a matter of continuous degree, but 
for some analytical purposes it has turned out to be convenient, to somewhat 
stipulatively, distinguish the levels indicated in table 2 cf. Allwood, 1976 and for a more 
technical treatment, Nivre, 1992. 
 
Table 2. Levels of intentionality and awareness in humacommunication 
 
Sender  Receiver 
• Indicate • Be influenced 
• Display • Perceive 
• Signal • Understand 
 
 
When information is indicated, the sender need not communicate the information in an 
intentional or aware manner.  The information is communicated only by the receiver 
being influenced in some manner.  For example,  A might be influenced by B's pupil 
size to think that she is interested in him.  When information is displayed, the sender is 
intending the receiver to perceive it.  For example, A might use a stronger accent to 
show B where he comes from.  When information is signalled, the sender is not only 
intending the receiver to perceive the information but also to perceive/understand that it 
is being displayed to him or her.  Signalling is the normal case in linguistic 
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communication.  Language, in fact, could be said to be a system for conventional 
signalling in the sense described here. 
 
All objects of perception including human behavior and action, as we have seen, can 
indicate information.  If the objects are manipulated to exhibit this information, the 
information is displayed.  To signal, i.e., to display that one is displaying, it is 
convenient to rely on a system like natural language which conventionally is built for 
signalling.  In natural language, articulated sounds (segmental (phonemes) and 
suprasegmental (prosody)) conventionally codify  relatively simple meaningful units 
(morphemes and words), which can be put together into more complex meaningful units 
according to rules of grammar for different types of meaning combination. 
 
Example 1 below illustrates the different cases 
 
 
Example 1 
A: Did he come 
B: You bet Signal =  A can bet on X 
 Eye brow raise Display =  Noteworthiness 
 prosody (Texas) Indicate =  Geographical origin 
 
 
In the example, B says you bet  with a Texas accent, raising his eye brows.  Using the 
levels of awareness and intentionality just distinguished, we may now say that B's verbal 
utterance signals that A can bet on X, B's eyebrow raise displays that there is something 
noteworthy about X, (his coming) and B's prosody indicates his/her geographical origin. 
 
The receiver may also take in information on different levels of awareness and 
intentionality.  Firstly, he or she might be merely causally influenced without any 
element of intentionality or awareness.  This would, for example, be the case in so-
called subliminal perception (Mehrabian, 1971) which is often involved in emotional 
influence.  Secondly, he/she might perceive the information without understanding it.  
This happens when additional interpretation is needed of what is perceived, for 
example, when is listening to an unknown language.  Thirdly, he/she might understand 
the information, which on the analysis presented here would mean that he/she were able 
to meaningfully connect the information with previously stored background 
information.   
 
Let me now continue the description of vehicles of joint information by turning to a 
discussion of what means of expression and reception can be employed in 
communication. 
 
 
4. Types of Expression and Reception 
 
In table 3 below, I give an overview of the means of production, transmission and 
reception typically used in human communication and dialog. 
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Table 3. Means of production, transmission and reception of information 
 
 
Production Physical Reception 
  Medium 
1. Direct means of  1. Direct 
 expression   reception 
 
 • Body acoustic wave  hearing 
 -  Articulatory gestures electromagnetic  sight 
   (speech, song) wave  touch 
 -  Other gestures molecules  smell 
      taste 
 • With an instrument stone 
   picture skin 
   writing clay 
    paper 
  
2. Means of representation 
 • Symbolic (phonetic script 
    --- Morse) 
 • Iconic (picture, writing) 
 • Indexical (audio, videotapes) 
 
3. Means of augmenting 
 physical medium 
   Megaphone 
   Microphone 
   Loudspeaker 
 
4. Means of transmission  2. Means of reception 
 (preserve, reinforce)    TV, radio receiver 
  TV, radio    telephone 
  telegraph, telephone 
 
 
 
Under point (1),we find means of production and reception which are directly controllable 
by human beings.  This can either be accomplished directly by bodily movements or by 
bodily movement in combination with directly controllable special instruments.  The most 
important communicative bodily movements are vocal and manual gestures and the 
primary modalities of reception are the five senses, especially sight and hearing.  The 
physical medium for sight and hearing are electromagnetic and acoustic waves, while 
smell and taste are carried by molecules.  If pictures and writing are used, the physical 
medium preserving them, historically, has been of many different kinds.  The effect of 
these physical media is that the coverage of communication is extended over time and 
space. 
 
The means of expressing and producing information are also means of representing 
information.  We can, following Peirce (cf. Buchler, 1955) classify means of representing 
information according to the type of relation holding between the representing object and 
the represented object.  Symbols are based on convention, e.g. words in a language, icons 
are based on similarity, e.g. pictures or diagrams and indexical representations are based 
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on contiguity and causality, e.g. a cloud representing rain or an index finger drawing 
attention to that which is being pointed to. 
 
In ordinary communication all three types of representation occur together. A single sign 
can, in fact, often carry information in all three ways.  The three relations are therefore 
above all analytically but not necessarily empirically distinct. 
 
Under point (3), we find various ways of augmenting the physical medium, such as 
megaphones, microphones and loudspeakers.  These have the effect of increasing the 
communicator's local spatial range.  Point (4) – means of transmission and reception – 
increases the effects found under (2) and (3) by more radically enabling us to bridge space 
and time through a combination of aids for production and reception going far beyond 
what is given in direct face to face communication. 
 
 
5. Types of Content 
 
5.1 Dimensions of content 
 
Let us now take a closer look at the information or content which is signalled through 
communicative activity. 
 
Each communicative act can be analyzed as having two basic communicative functions: an 
expressive and an evocative cf. Allwood, 1976 and 1995.  The expressive dimension 
reveals the communicator' s attitude, e.g. belief, surprise, wonder or desire to what he/she 
is communicating.  The evocative dimension reveals what reaction the communicator 
intends to evoke in the addressee, e.g. belief, surprise, intention to action, action, etc. 
 
Languages are built to accommodate the signalling of such attitudes through the default 
functions which conventionally are tied to moods.  In table 4 below, some of these are 
exemplified 
 
Table 4 Default functions of moods 
  
 Expressive Evocative 
Declarative Belief Belief 
Interrogative Desire for information The desired information 
Imperative Wish for action A The wished for action A 
Exclamative Any attitude X Perception of X 
 
 
 
By using a declarative mood, a person can thus both express a belief and try to evoke a 
similar belief in an interlocutor.  By using the interrogative mood he/she can both express 
a desire for information and make an attempt to evoke that information from an 
interlocutor and by using the imperative mood he/she can both express a wish for an action 
and attempt to get an interlocutor to carry out the action.  As we can see, there is mostly a 
clear relation between the attitude expressed and the effect which is intended to be evoked.  
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For example, the expression of a desire is linked to the intention to evoke action which 
would satisfy the desire. 
 
The attitudes which can be expressed or evoked in communication can be analytically 
subdivided in a fairly standard way into: 
 
(i) cognitive (e.g. believe, know etc) 
(ii) emotive and (e.g. fear, happy etc) and 
(iii) conative (e.g. want, intend, etc) 
 
Most attitudes, of course, contain ingredients of all three kinds.  The actions which can be 
evoked are, in general, in a fairly straightforward fashion linked to the attitudes which can 
be evoked.  So, for example, if A requests B to do X, the request is intended to evoke an 
action by way of the evocation of a mainly conative attitude, ie. the intention to do X. 
 
Further, utterances can be analyzed as to their directedness.  They can, for example, be 
directed to a particular addresser or group of addressees.  They can also be addressed to 
everyone in a group or perhaps, even, to no on in particular. 
 
Signalled content can further be subdivided as to whether it is explicit or implicit.  
Compare examples 2 and 3 below. 
 
2. A: Close the window 
3. A: It is cold in here 
 
Example 2 is an explicit request, whereas example 3 might in a particular situation, where 
it is clear that A would like it so be warmer, function as an implicit request to close the 
window.  The explicit content is, thus, directly connected with the means of representation 
(usually symbolic) used for signalling, while the implicit content is dependent on the 
relation between the signalled means of representation and the context. 
 
5.2 Evocation, evaluation, response and obligations 
 
The sharing of information in dialog is motivated by a combination of interest and 
obligation.  The sender through his/her contributions attempts to evoke a reaction in the 
receiver which will exhibit some combination of cognitive, emotive, conative and 
behavioral properties.  The receiver upon noticing that a communicative contribution is 
directed at him/her has to evaluate: 
 
(i) contact 
(ii)  perception 
(iii) understanding 
(iv)  reaction to evocative intentions 
 
This means that he/she has to evaluate whether he/she is willing and able to share the 
information (and possibly additional information), to perceive it, to understand it and react 
in harmony with the evocative intentions.  Such evaluation seems to be motivated by pure 
self interest and seems to be a more or less automatic, biologically given reflex.  It 
constitutes a necessary but not sufficient step in building up dialog cohesion.  If dialogue, 
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communication and social structure is to be created, the person who has the receiver role 
must now take on the sender role and report on the result of the evaluation. 
 
If he/she cannot (or does not want to) continue contact, this can be reported directly or 
indirectly by utterances like I can't talk now, I have to rush.  If he/she cannot (does not 
want to) hear, utterances like what, pardon, excuse me etc., can be used. 
 
If he/she cannot (does not want to) understand, depending on circumstances he/she can say 
I don't understand, what do you mean, etc. 
 
If he/she cannot (does not want to) react in harmony with evocative intention, he/she can 
say so but cooperation, ethical considerations and trust would normally require that some 
reason is given for the lack of compliance. 
 
In reporting on the evaluation, the receiver is, in fact, always immediately affected by the 
nature of the interaction which the evaluated contribution is a part of.  What kind of 
activity is it?  What is the receiver's role in this activity (see below section 7)?  What 
degree of cooperation, hostility characterizes it?  
 
The answers to questions such as these will, to a large extent, influence the outcome of the 
evaluation and the responses which are produced. 
 
What keeps a dialog together, enables it and restricts it, must therefore be sought in a 
combination of the nature of the contributions that the participants direct to each other and 
the nature of the joint interests (or lack of interests) and obligations (or lack of obligations) 
they have toward each other in virtue of the activity they are pursuing. 
 
5.3 Dimensions of context 
 
As we have see, implicit information relies on context in order to be conveyed.  The 
following parameters can be helpful in classifying different kinds of contextual influence. 
 
(i) ± linguistic:  Is the source of contextual influence linguistic or nonlinguistic? 
 
(ii) ± perceptual: Is the source of contextual influence directly and continuously 
available through perception to the participants. 
 
(iii) ± activity:  Contextual influence is mediated not only through perception, but 
also through memory.  Since communicators mostly are engaged in some joint 
activity, perception and memory related to this activity is one of the most salient 
influences on communication 
 
(iv) ± other memory activation: over and above directly given perceivable 
information and activity assumptions, there are many other kinds of information 
that can be activated through memory and help determine what interpretation we 
give our interlocutor's linguistic or other communicative behavior. 
 
Let us now consider some examples of contextual influence.  I will first consider linguistic 
context (cotext) and then non-linguistic context (cosituation).  In the examples, I will 
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describe different kinds of contexts through feature matrices based on the parameters given 
above. 
 
 (i) The first kind of context can be characterized as follows: 
 (+ linguistic, + perception, + other activation). 
 This kind of contextual influence occurs, for example, when we realize that the 
word heavy  in the expressions heavy stone, heavy argument  and heavy water  must 
mean different things.  The information activated by the head constituent of the NP 
(heavy X) together with the requirement that heavy  be compatible with this 
information determines the interpretation we give to heavy. 
 
(ii) The second kind of context is  (+ linguistic, + perception, + activity). 
 This kind of context is also linguistic and can be found in dialogs.   The inter-
pretation of the function of an utterance very often relies on an interpretation of the 
activity function of the previous utterance.  Compare the following examples: 
 
4. A: It's raining  
 B:  Yes (it is)   agreement 
 
5. A: It's not raining 
 B: Yes (it is)   disagreement 
 
6. A: Will you close the window 
 B: Yes   acceptance 
 
The semantics of the word yes  is such that after a positive statement it signals 
agreement but after a negative statement it signals disagreement and after a request 
it signals acceptance. 
 
(iii) Let us now turn the influence of nonlinguistic context (cosituation).  The simplest 
cases probably occur with what is often called deixis, cf. Lyons, 1977. Words like I, 
you, here, these, now, then, tense endings etc., require access to the speech situation 
(speaker, hearer, place and time) to be given fully fledged meanings.  This third kind 
of context can be described as follows (- linguistic, + perceptual). 
 Over and above the directly perceptual information, in many cases,  activity or 
other activated information would also be relevant.  This would, for example, be 
the case if one wished to determine the social relations between the interlocutors, in 
connection with use of personal pronouns in languages which do not distinguish 
differences in social status by distinct pronominal forms. 
 
(iv) In contexts of type (ii), the influence of activity is directly linguistically present 
through utterances in a dialog.  The influence of activity can, however, also be non-
linguistic or perhaps more correctly, linguistically implicit as when the purpose of a 
joint activity or the role relation of speaker and addressee determine the 
communicative function of an utterance.  We can characterize this type of context 
as (- linguistic, + activity). 
 
 It is this kind of contextual influence which determines the implicit communicative 
functions in examples 7 and 8 below. 
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  Role Utterance Communicative 
    function 
 7. A (teacher):  what are you laughing at (stop laughing) 
  to student  
  during class 
 
 8. B: (pupil):  what are you laughing at (request for information) 
   to another pupil  
  during break 
 
The same utterance is used in 7 and 8, but because of the differences in speaker role 
and embedding activity, can be used with quite different communicative functions 
derivable from the requirement of role and activity 
 
(v) Often the contextual influence is more complex and combines all sources of 
contextual influence.  This is, for example, the case when speech act labels are used 
to assign communicative function.  Is the utterance it's raining a warning or an 
example of joyful tidings?  This clearly depends both on the situation and on the 
lexical meaning of the expressions warning and joyful tidings.  To be a warning the 
utterance must be intended to, or have the effect of, directing an interlocutor to a 
danger or something unpleasant.  To be tidings of joy, the utterance must point to 
something which gives the interlocutor joy.  Only by knowledge of the activity at 
hand, and other non-linguistic circumstances relevant to the interlocutors, is it 
possible to decide whether either of the labels would describe the communicative 
function of the utterance adequately. 
 
5.4 Referential content 
 
As mentioned in section 3.4, utterances are put together by various types of grammatical 
operations which determine how the meanings of more elementary constituents are to be 
put together.  Among the most important such grammatical operations are the following:  
Reference constructing, predication, attribution, coordination and subordination. 
 
Using these operations, a speaker can use language to convey information to his/her 
interlocutors. 
 
In order to do this, the information must, however, first be broken up into units which fit 
the scheme of categories made available by the language, which means using semantic-
epistemic categories like the following, cf. Allwood, 1989. 
 
entities properties   states 
  relations  (courses of) events 
  processes 
 
In a language like English the 4 most elementary semantic-epistemic categories (entities, 
properties, relations and processes) are primarily made available through parts of speech 
while the complex categories, states and courses of events, are expressed through different 
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kinds of sentences.  The semantic-epistemic categories can, in this way, be made to 
roughly match linguistic categories in the following manner. 
nouns  adjectives, adverbs   sentences 
  prepositions, conjunctions  sentences 
  verbs 
 
The moods of a language provide certain particular ways of combining the linguistically 
categorized information through a particular combination of grammatical operations.  
Compare below example (9) where the entity door  is referred to and the property/process 
open  is related to door through predication, questioning, requesting and attribution. 
 
 Explicit Implicit 
(9)         —\ 
 Statement The door is open open 
 
              / 
 Question Is the door open open 
 
            \ 
 Request Open the door open 
 
       /\/ 
 Exclamation An open door open 
 
The effect of the explicit expressions in (9) can, in a particular context where the referent 
(the door) is salient, also be achieved implicitly by expressing the predicate open with 
different intonational patterns like those indicated in  the right column of example (9). 
 
 
6. The Structure of a Communicative Contribution 
 
6.1 Four types of information 
 
Let me now turn to how utterances in spoken dialogue (more generally, communicative 
contributions) are structured.  Example (10) provides a point of departure. 
 
Example (10) 
 
A: Did he come 
B: Yeah  you can  eh   bet on that 
 nod     gaze away 
 
 ICM ERM    OCM  ERM 
 B  BB 
 
B's utterance has been annotated with four abbreviations which denote four types of 
information provided by the utterance. 
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(i) ERM: The Explicit Referential Message is contained in the words you can bet on 
that which relies on providing information.  By using the linguistic categories and 
grammatical operations discussed above.  ERM's are what usually is studied in 
linguistics 
 
(ii) ICM: Interactive Communication Management consists of procedures and 
mechanisms whereby interlocutors manage their communicative interaction.  ICM 
includes, for example, systems for turn management, feedback and sequencing.  In 
this case, the feedbacker givers yeah  and the head nod are used to signal 
perception, understanding and affirmative answer, cf. below, section 6.2. 
 
(iii) OCM: Own Communication Management consists of procedures and mecha-
nisms which enable a communicator to manage his/her own communicative activity 
online.  OCM includes mechanisms for signalling and displaying that the speaker 
needs time for planning and choice of expressions (such as the hesitation sound eh 
and behavior of the gazing away type) and mechanisms for changing a made 
contribution in a way that does not confuse the interlocutor. 
 
(iv) B:  Background information is essential for the interpretation of any utterance.  It 
consists of the kinds of implicit contextual information discussed above.  In this 
case an interpretation of the word you requires perceptual access to who the listener 
is.  The word that  requires access to the previous utterance and the phrase bet on  
requires access to other activated information which would imply that the speaker 
feels certain of his answer since one only bets on that which one feels certain about. 
 
6.2 Interactive management 
 
Since the topic of this paper is the structure of dialog, I will now discuss the notion of 
interaction management a little more in detail.  Let us therefore  take another look  at 
interactive communicative management functions and attempt to say a little more about 
them.  I will consider three types: 
 (i) sequences 
 (ii) turn management 
 (iii) feedback. 
 
Sequences 
 
Most complex activities can be subdivided in different ways.  Such divisions can be 
made both with respect to an activity holistically (including communication) and more 
specifically with regard to its communicative aspects (cf. Schegloff and Sacks, 1973).  
For example, it is often possible to divide an activity into subactivities or topics which 
in turn can be subdivided into sequences of communicative acts or into sequences of 
premises and conclusions. 
 
Such units frequently are not merely an analytical tool for a researcher but also have 
psychological and social reality for the participants in the activity.  Thus, they are often 
connected with mechanisms for: 
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 (i) initiation (opening, entering an activity, a subactivity or a topic) 
 (ii) maintenance (maintaining a subactivity or topic) 
 (iii) changing (changing a subactivity or topic) 
 (iv) ending (closing an activity, a subactivity or a topic) 
 
The motivation for mechanisms of this type should be fairly clear.  In order to achieve 
the goals of most activities, a decomposition of the activity as a whole into component 
subactivities will often be necessary on logical, physical and functional grounds.  
Everything can not be done simultaneously, rather a sequence of partial results which fit 
into each other is required.  Even if in most cases such divisions can be functionally 
motivated, a subdivision may in some cases be the result of a historically given custom 
which is no longer clearly functionally motivated.  So both historical convention and 
functional necessity are relevant  It is also interesting to consider why communicative 
interactions are divided into distinct utterances (communicative contributions) and 
characteristic combinations of these (cf. Sacks, 1975).  The basic reason is perhaps that 
human  beings are not rigidly integrated parts of a collective information processing 
system, but distributed and fairly autonomous information processing agents who have a 
need for flexible information coordination.  However, since there is also a need for a 
certain rigidity and predictability, this leads to the building up of communicative 
obligations in relation to certain evocative communicative intentions in certain contexts.  
For example, you should try to answer questions or you should try to respond to 
greetings. This, in turn, leads to the existence of fairly stable combinations of speech 
acts (adjacency pairs) such as greeting-greeting, question-relevant answer, etc. 
 
Management of turns 
 
The next aspect of interactive communication management that we will consider is 
management of turns. In the present framework, a turn is defined as a speaker's right to 
the floor. (This definition is slightly different from the classical one given in Sacks, 
Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974).  Turns differ from utterances since one can have the turn 
without uttering anything.  One can also utter something without having the turn, for 
example to give feedback to a current speaker.  Norms regulating the right to the floor 
are connected with such things as who may speak, about what topic, at what time, how 
long and in what manner.  Activities can vary from allowing simultaneous talk with few 
restrictions as to topic, time, duration and manner to distribution of turns administered 
by a specially designated .turn assigner, e.g. a chairman who might impose clear 
restrictions on topic, time and manner. 
 
Turn management is carried out through a number of subfunctions (for an early 
description cf. Duncan, 1974), whose verbal and nonverbal expression is often 
standardized in a way which may also vary with activity and culture.  Some of these are: 
 
(i) Means for assigning turns 
(ii) Means for accepting the turn 
(iii) Means for taking the turn (interrupting) 
(iv) Means for maintaining (keeping) the turn 
(v) Means for yielding the turn 
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If we reflect on the reasons and motivations for why there might exist ways of managing 
the distribution of turns, I would like to point to two types of motivation. 
 
(i) Physical-psychological constraints:  there are physical and physiological 
constraints on human information processing ability.  We cannot both send and 
receive a large number of simultaneous messages.  Even sending or receiving 
two simultaneous messages causes problems.  It is also the case that several 
simultaneous messages may interfere with each other and lessen the probability 
that any one of them reaches its destination. 
 
(ii) Requirements of motivated, rational and cooperative communication and need of 
conventions to support these requirements: 
 
Given the already mentioned physical and physiological constraints on communication, 
and given rational constraints having to do with communicating efficiently in some 
activity and ethical constraints (for example, allowing everyone a just chance to both 
send and receive information) which are relevant for many types of interaction, a system 
for managing turns is clearly motivated.  Since, however, the constraints already 
mentioned (physical, rational and ethical) still leave many degrees of freedom for how 
this system should be managed, we may empirically observe that systems of 
conventions bound to particular cultures and activities have developed.  For example, in 
Swedish and other western cultures, it is much harder to interrupt someone (take the 
turn) in a formal meeting than it is in an informal meeting. 
 
Feedback 
 
Another aspect of interactive communication management concerns means to ascertain 
whether your interlocutor is able and willing to continue, perceive, understand and how 
he reacts to the main evocative intentions of your message.  The set of verbal and bodily 
means which allow interlocutors, in a minimally obtrusive way, to both elicit and give 
information about these basic communicative functions has been called the linguistic 
feedback system (cf. Allwood, Nivre and Ahlsén, 1992).  As is the case with the 
systems of turn management, the conventions involved in systems for managing 
feedback with regard to contact, perception, understanding and main evocative intention 
vary with culture and activity.  So, for example, in informal conversation auditive 
feedback seems to be more important in Swedish and Japanese conversations than in 
conversations in the Rio de la Plata area of South America, where visual feedback is 
more important.  An example of activity influence can, for example, be seen in the way 
a simultaneous "mm" (as an indicator of contact, perception/understanding and possibly 
acceptance) occurs in informal conversation but not in public lectures (in Swedish 
culture). 
 
The main ways of giving feedback linguistically are the following: 
 
(1) Bodily  - mainly head movements 
 
(2) Spoken (i) FB words like yes, no, m with various phonological and 
morphological operations allowing expansion of these words 
(for example, Swedish: ja -> jaa, ja -> a or ja -> ingressive a) 
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  (ii) Repetition of words in a previous utterance to show agreement 
or to elicit confirmation or more information. 
 
  (iii) Pronominal or other types of reformulation, e.g. B can agree to 
A's utterance of it's raining by saying it does. 
 
Languages show different preferences with regard to which means are most often 
employed for giving feedback.  Some languages are yes, no, m languages like Swedish 
or English.  Others mainly employ repetition or reformulation like Chinese. 
 
Swedish, for example, exhibits the following FB paradigm, in which the various 
expressions can be used with slightly different functional values: 
 
Yes ja - jaha -  ha 
Yes (objection to  
negative statement) jo - joho -  ho 
No nä - nähä - hä 
m m - mhm - hm 
ah ah - aha -  ha 
 
Many of these functional values would, in English, have to be rendered by the use of 
words like Oh or well in combination with yes, no and m, cf. Heritage, 1984. 
 
If we turn to the reasons and motivations for management of communicative feedback, 
it seems plausible that contact, perception and understanding are a sine qua non of one-
way communication while two-way communication also requires reactions to evocative 
intentions.  Without feedback, in this sense, and ways of managing it, no communicative 
activity or system of communication can ever hope to aspire to such properties as 
robustness, relevance, adequacy and flexibility. 
 
Feedback systems can also be related to another fairly basic type of management in 
communication, namely, the need for ways of managing (repairing, correcting) other 
interlocutor's contributions with regard to correctness, relevance, etc.  Such reactions to 
other interlocutors can be seen as a kind of elaborated feedback governed by various 
types of normative considerations. 
 
As for the reasons for this type of feedback, one might say that it exists in order to 
provide interlocutors with the means to impose normative constraints (e.g. ethical or 
rational) on each other. 
 
 
7. Embedding in Activity, Institution and Culture  
 
One of Wittgenstein's basic claims, cf. Wittgenstein 1953 was that the meaning of 
linguistic expressions should be analyzed as their use in different language games. In 
activity-based communication analysis, Allwood 1995 (or communicative activity 
analysis), this claim is further analyzed in the following way: 
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The choice and meaning of linguistic expressions is seen as a product of the interaction 
between an inherent "meaning potential" of the expression and the use it is put to in 
linguistic constructions, communicative functions and joint social activities.  The use is, 
thus, defined in terms of (i) collocations in different types of grammatical structure, (ii) 
participation in different types of communicative functions (see section 7.3) and (iii) 
occurrence in a specific type of social activity. 
 
Let us now briefly consider the notion of a social activity.  A social activity can be 
characterized by the following parameters (cf. Allwood 1980 and 1984): 
 
1. Type, purpose, function: procedures 
2. Roles: competence/obligations/rights 
3. Instruments: machines/media 
4. Other physical environment 
 
The type, purpose or function of an activity gives it its rationale, i.e., the reason for its 
existence.  So by finding out the purpose, we get at least a vague idea about what means 
could be used to pursue the activity.  I have used two words "purpose" and "function" to 
indicate that an activity might be pursued for many reasons, some of which are less 
commonly acknowledged - these latter one might then call functions.  The purpose and 
function have often given rise to procedures which help define what the activity is all 
about. An activity is also reinforced by the fact that there is a term for it. When we 
understand terms like "discussion", "negotiation", "lecture" etc., what we understand is 
mostly precisely the function or purpose of a specific type of activity 
 
One of the means whereby an activity gets pursued, again and again, is by being 
associated with certain standard activity roles, i.e., standard tasks in the activity which 
usually are performed by one person.  The activity roles can, on the grounds of this 
association, be analyzed into competence requirements, obligations and rights, where 
the competence requirement can be seen as a precondition of the obligations.  As an 
example, consider lecturing as an activity.  The purpose is something like oral transfer 
of information in a coherent fashion to a larger number of people.  Stereotypically, the 
activity gives rise to two roles that of the lecturer and that of a member of the audience.  
The lecturer is obliged to talk coherently on an agreed topic (in which he/she is 
supposed to be competent) and the audience should listen, at least they should seem like 
they are listening and perhaps critically evaluate and ask questions. 
 
Instruments and machines also play an important role for many activities and will, if 
they are used, create their own patterns of communication. For some they are necessary.  
For others they are more ancillary. Consider, for example, the influence of blackboard, 
chalk and overhead projectors on lecturing.  
 
Other physical circumstances can also be relevant like level of sound or lighting.  If the 
acoustics are bad, the lecturer will have to raise his voice;  if the light is too bright, no 
overhead-projector can be used, etc. 
 
For most human activities, communication plays an important instrumental role.  The 
nature of this role can vary from being necessary, like in a lecture or a negotiation, to 
being helpful but perhaps not always necessary.  At least, the need for communication 
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might diminish after the basic pattern of the activity has been established, like in garden 
work or fishing.  An activity can, however, be predominantly communicative, like 
talking in order to relax, even if talking strictly speaking is not necessary for relaxing.  
In the same way, communication is sometimes necessary like in housing construction, 
even if housing construction cannot be said to be a predominantly communicative 
activity. 
 
For both activities and communication, a certain degree of cooperation is essential.  In 
Allwood 1976, it was suggested that cooperation can be analyzed by four conditions 
(see above section 3.3), each of which is sufficient but not necessary to justify an 
attribution of some degree of cooperation.  Together, the criteria, however, constitute 
necessary and sufficient conditions for what could be called ideal cooperation. 
 
Communication in itself always involves some degree of cooperation but the degree of 
cooperation is strengthened by participation in a joint activity.  Consider again lecturing.  
If lecturing is to be successful, the lecturer and the audience must cognitively consider 
each other, they must also actively work toward the purpose of the activity, which will 
imply structuring and meaningful content, on the part of the lecturer, and active 
listening, critical evaluation and maybe note-taking, on the part of the audience.  Ethical 
consideration also plays a role, the lecturer should not waste the time of the audience, 
not insult them, not make  slanderous remarks about other persons, etc., and the 
audience should not disturb the lecture but generally show courteous behavior.  Trust 
can also play a role, the lecturer trusts the audience to pay attention and the audience 
trusts the lecturer to be well prepared and to give them correct information, on a level 
which they are capable of handling. 
 
It is obvious from the analysis just given that the ethical and functional aspects of an 
activity can strengthen each other.  To do what is ethically right in relation to lecturing 
(or any given activity) is mostly also to do what is functionally desirable or, at least, not 
dysfunctional. 
 
The strength of the obligations which are generated on ethical, functional and perhaps 
other grounds, will vary according to circumstances. For example,  if there are no text 
books, or if the lectures cover material not occurring in the text books, but occurring in 
tests, the functional necessity for note taking increases. 
 
The requirements on the activity rules, thus, include requirements on communication.  
The different communication roles can be connected with specific ethically and 
functionally motivated obligations and tasks.  For example, in teaching, we expect the 
teacher to be sincere, to motivate his claims by giving evidence and to take the previous 
knowledge and general state of fatigue of his/her audience into account.  We also expect 
the teacher to check whether his students have understood and learned, which is one of 
the things that might distinguish a teacher from a lecturer.  Another perhaps weaker 
expectation is that a teacher should encourage students to ask questions to further their 
knowledge and to check their understanding.  This means that some of the 
communicative acts which are typical of a teacher are "stating" to describe and explain, 
"asking questions" to check and control and "making requests" to instruct and control. If 
we turn instead to the students;  they are supposed to listen, try to understand and to 
some extent evaluate, learn and integrate with previous knowledge.  This means that 
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students typically will "be quiet", "listen" and "try to understand and learn".  When they 
are in the sender role, they will "give feedback" to indicate perception and 
understanding.  They will "answer questions" and on a rare occasion "ask the teacher a 
question" or "make an objection". 
 
In figure 1, below, I will now summarize some of the main features of how dialog is 
embedded in activity, institution and culture. 
 
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
 Macro Social Institution 
Social activity 
function/purpose
Individual 
background 
 
 
 
Motives 
Values 
Attitudes 
Beliefs 
 
 
sex, age 
religion 
occupation 
wealth 
education 
ethnic 
group
Activity role 
+ sender role 
 
Individual 
sending 
activities: 
planning & 
producing 
com. behavior 
and action
Instruments 
Artefacts of 
a) environment 
b) activity 
c) communication
COMMUNICATION
 
Body 
Speech                Words 
Writing               Grammar 
 
 
                                 
Background             expressive 
info.                      evocative 
Explicit  
Attitudes, ref 
content           
 
Sequences 
Turntaking 
Feedback 
Repairs 
Rhythm 
Spatial relations
Activity role 
+ receiver role 
 
Individual 
receiving 
activities: 
reacting 
apprehending 
understanding
Individual 
background 
 
 
Motives 
Values 
Attitudes 
Beliefs 
 
 
sex, age 
religion 
occupation 
wealth 
education 
ethnic 
group
Biological 
Psychological
Social
Biological
Expressive dimensions
Content dimensions
Interactive dimensions
  
 
 
Physical Environment of Activity 
Social
Own communication  
management
Choice 
Change
 
 
Figure 1.  Embedding of dialogical communication in activity, social institution and nature. 
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8.  Conclusion 
 
I hope this paper, which, when started initially was conceived of as a kind of tutorial, 
has given a fair overview both of some of the dimensions which contribute to the 
multidimensionality of dialog and of some of the forces and mechanisms which keep 
dialog and communication together and have made them into the efficient instruments 
of human coordinated activity that they are. 
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